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Aviation and Aerospace Law
PAUL V MIFSUD, EsQ., AARON
AND ANGELINE CHEN, EsQ.*

SCHILDHAUS,

ESQ., LT. COL.

WILLIAM SCHMIDT,

I. Aviation Law Developments
In January 1999, House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Bud
Shuster stated that fiscal year 2000 would be the "Year of Aviation," and he increased the
size of the Aviation Subcommittee from thirty-two to fifty members.' Among Shuster's
stated objectives was his plan to take the Aviation Trust Fund off budget in order to reform
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and improve the aviation infrastructure of the
United States. He also stated that airline competition remained an important issue.2
In addition to funding and competition issues, a separate bill proposed by Shuster dealt
with safety initiatives, collision avoidance systems on cargo airlines, whistleblower protection for FAA airline employees, national park over flights, and bogus parts. Hearings were
held to cover the financial needs and safety of airports, the FAA and the aviation system,
including air traffic control, and to examine the economic impact of airports and their
improvements on surrounding communities and the economy.'
On February 1, 1999, the Department of Transportation (DOT) explained that the key
goals of the Clinton administration included the reduction of fatal accidents by eight percent and a significant reduction in airport delays. A seven percent increase in safety funding,
over $1 billion, was being sought in 1999.4 Despite the U.S. government's stated aim of
reducing airline accident and fatality rates drastically, scheduled airline and commuter car*Paul V. Mifsud is Vice President, Government and Legal Affairs, U.S., for KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, and
is also Vice-Chair of the Aviation and Aerospace Law Committee. Aaron Schildhaus practices international
law in Washington, D.C., and is also Co-Chair of the Aviation and Aerospace Law Committee. Lt. Col. William
G. Schmidt is Co-Chair of the Aviation and Aerospace Law Committee. Angeline G. Chen is Assistant General

Counsel at the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT). She also serves asViceChair for the Aviation and Aerospace Law Committee. The statements in this article are those of the author
only and do not necessarily reflect the official position of INTELSAT or any of its member countries.
1. See House TransportationCommittee Expands Aviation Panel in Trust Fund Assault, AvIATIoN DAILY, Jan. 8,
1999, at 39.
2. See Home TransportationCommittee Chairman,AVIATION DAILY, Jan. 27, 1999, at 141.
3. See Sbuster Multi-Year Aviation Bill Likely in Late February, AviATmN DAILY, Jan. 28, 1999, at 151.
4. See Adrianne Larson, DOT Proposes $10.1 Billion for FAA in Fiscal 2000, Funded by User Fees, AviATION
DAILY, Feb. 2, 1999, at 177.
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rier accident rates were up last year from 1998. The regional carrier accident rate rose last
year from 0.408 per 100,000 departures to 0.430 with the number of accidents increasing
from thirty-three to forty-eight. Fatalities in scheduled commercial aviation accidents involving aircraft with ten or more seats operating under FAR Part 121 rose from zero to
twelve-eleven people dying in the American Airlines MD-80 accident in Little Rock last
year and one person being killed in a Continental Express ATR 42 accident, also in Little
Rock. For the second consecutive year, U.S. charter airlines operating under FAR Part 121
reported no fatal accidents, while the number of accidents fell from seven to four. The
charter airline accident rate per 100,000 departures fell from 1.574 to 0.840. Part 135 U.S.
regional airline services saw fatalities rise year-on-year from zero to twelve and the accident
rate climb from 1.131 to 2.453, more than doubling the rate. However, the U.S. air taxi
industry reported one less accident in 1999 than in 1998 as well as fewer fatalities-the
number of people killed falling from forty-eight to thirty-eight and the accident rate dropping from 3.03 in 1998 to 2.71 in 1999. s
Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater stated that the Clinton administration wished
to turn the FAA air traffic management into a performance-oriented, user-fee-based system,
making it operate more like a business. 6 In the same month, the Administration also continued its efforts to promote and enhance domestic competition at airports, and between
network carriers and start-ups.7
A.

DOMESTIC COMPETITION AND THE VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES

The DOT's concerns about domestic competition reflected the continuation of one of
the major issues of 1998, which the airline industry was able to defuse by introducing its
own voluntary consumer protection initiative. In order to best understand the issues, however, a brief review is in order.
In 1998, the competition issue had been fueled by allegations from regional airlines and
consumer groups of predatory practices by the major airlines. Secretary Slater identified
these as including fare disparities, lack of service, and complaints by new entrant carriers
of anti-competitive practices.' Congressional leaders joined the fray. SenateJudiciary Committee member Charles Grassley accused the DOT of ignoring aJustice Department analysis claiming that small and medium-sized airports accused the major airlines of using
predatory tactics to drive low-cost carriers from the marketplace.9 The Association of Travel
Agents (ASTA) and the Coalition of Travel Industry Parity (CTIP) sought legislation that
would protect travel agents from alleged competitive abuses. ASTA endorsed SenatorJohn
McCain's Aviation Competition Enhancement Act. 10

5. See Chris Kjelgaard, U.S. Airline Accident Rate, FatalitiesClimb in 1999, AIR TRANSPORT INTELLIGENCE
NEWS, Feb. 25, 2000.

6. See States Presses Clinton Planfor Fee-FundedATC,AirportCapacity Growth, AVIATiON DAILY, Feb. 4, 1999,
at 195.
7. See Murphy Outlines DOT's Multiple Efforts to Improve Competition, AVIATION DAILY, June 15, 1999, at 4.
8. Secretary Slater was quoted as saying: "Aggressive competition is good but anti-competitive practices
hurt consumers, and it is the Department of Transportation's job to vigilantly watch the market to protect
them." Slater Rebuts ReregulationCharges;Insists DOT Wants Strong Competition, AVIATION DAILY, Feb. 4,1998.
9. Grassley is quoted as saying: "I am increasingly disturbed that the U.S. DOT is not using its statutory
authority to maintain airline competition by preventing and punishing unlawful behavior in the airline industry." Senate judiciary Committee Member Faults DOTfor Ignoring DOI,AVIATION DAILY, Feb. 25, 1998, at 317.
10. See ASTA Announces Support of Consumer Airline Legislation, AVIATION DAILY, Feb. 25, 1998, at 318.
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The airline industry responded vigorously, stating that the DOT's proposed guidelines
constituted reregulation of the industry. They insisted that existing antitrust laws and regulations already provided sufficient competition oversight. The Department of Justice's
Transportation, Energy and Agriculture Section had issued subpoenas to a number of lower
cost carriers seeking evidence of predatory practices or exclusionary conduct by the major
carriers." Numerous hearings were held as congressional interest in the competition issues
peaked.2 The DOT put forth a proposed airline competition policy." Senator McCain
asked the Government Accounting Office (GAO) to report on the competitive implications
of industry consolidation given the potential American-U.S. Airways, United-Delta, and
Northwest-Continental alliances.14 The resulting debate involved a complex and conflicting
array of interests, e.g., labor, travel agents, consumer groups, airports, communities, industry, manufacturers, etc.
The major airlines, led by the Air Transport Association (ATA), mounted an aggressive
campaign. They complained of unfair allegations and reregulation. 1 They alleged that the
economic woes of smaller airlines were due to economic mismanagement and not to
predation. The anti-competition forces gained political momentum with the addition of
a coalition of labor, the National Consumers League, and small airports opposing the
16
guidelines.
Throughout the first half of 1999, the pressure on the industry continued. At a news
conference on March 11, Vice President Al Gore outlined proposed regulations and leg-

11. See JusticeSubpoenas Small Carrierson Anticompetitive Practicesby Majors, AVIATION DAILY, Feb. 27, 1998,
at 333.
12. See Competition Issues High on CongressionalAviationAgenda, AVIATION DAILY, Mar. 2, 1998, at 341; DOT
Predatory Practice Guidelines Near; Congress Weighs Competition Actions, AVIATION DAILY, Mar. 6, 1998, at 377;
Senate Readies Competition Initiatives; Backers Deny ReregulationLabel, AVIATION DAILY, Mar. 25, 1998, at 489.
13. Interim Notice Requesting Comments on the Statement of the DOT's Enforcement Policy Regarding
Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in the Air Transportation Industry, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,919 (1998).
14. See SenatorJohnMcCain Will Ask GAOfor Report, AVIATION DAILY, Apr. 27, 1998, at 155.
15. The debate got particularly bitter when the ATA ran full-page advertisements in the Washington Post
and Wall StreetJournalattacking the "We-Know-Best" crowd at the DOT. See ATA RunsAds Attacking DOT
Competition Guidelines, AVIATION DAILY, May 15, 1998, at 280.
16. See American Pilots ProtestDOT Competition Guidelines, AVIATION DAILY, May 26, 1998, at 332. Bowing
to the growing political pressure, Secretary Slater agreed to establish a task force on airport practices and their
impact on airline competition. See DOT To Study Airport Impact on Competition;Extends Policy CommentDeadline,
AVIATION DAILY, May 20, 1998, at 303. As the debate progressed, observers were surprised to see that smaller
airports were questioning the wisdom of the competition policy. For example, Arkansas' Airport Commission
filed an opposition to the DOT policy because it "would effectively eliminate meaningful competition and
would in all likelihood provide an unfair competitive advantage to some smaller carriers ... providing an
artificial shelter for low-fare carriers who provide limited point-to-point service may result in a loss of existing
hub carriers." See Arkansas Airport Sees Small Towns Losing Under DOT Competition Policy, AVIATION DAILYJune
5, 1998, at 402. Thereafter, the National Consumers League (NCL) joined labor and small communities in
claiming that artificial protection for smaller carriers was not wise competition policy. Rather, the group favored
enforcement of existing antitrust laws. See Consumer Group Aligns With Unions; Opposes DOTCompetition Policy,
AVIATION DAILY,June 16, 1998, at 429. Soon, Senators representing smaller communities joined the opposition.
See Frist, HagelOppose Competition Policy, FavorLegislation,AVIATION DAILY, June 16, 1998, at 464. The growing
opposition culminated in proposals to delay DOT action pending further study. See House Leadership Mulls
Options on Competition Rules, AVIATION DAILY, June 22, 1998, at 495. As a consequence, Congress passed the
Airline Service Improvement Act, calling for an independent study by the National Academy of Science's
National Research Council. See DOT Retains Predatory Enforcement Power But Studies Set FurtherBattles, AviATION DAILY, June 26, 1998, at 527.
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islative proposals that would require airlines to disclose their policies on flight cancellations
and delays, file monthly reports detailing passenger complaints, disclose code-sharing arrangements, and increase compensation paid to passengers who are bumped from flights
or lose luggage." The airlines agreed in principle to address these issues but argued that
new regulations or legislation would require them to hire additional staff and raise the cost
of tickets.i 8 On March 12, 1999, the Business Travel Coalition (BTC) sent an open letter
to the chief executive officers of the nation's major airlines urging them to address passenger
complaints.' 9 By late May, as a result of this ongoing dialogue, the airlines indicated their
intent to make customer service improvements, and the House Transportation Aviation
Subcommittee recognized it.
Subcommittee Majority Counsel David Schaffer stated that the "airlines say they have
gotten the message." Accordingly, he said that the House version of a Passenger Bill of
Rights would be watered down and might not be needed at all. Simultaneously, the Senate
Commerce Aviation Subcommittee was working on a voluntary approach to passenger
rights3 °
On June 17, 1999, the members of the ATA issued the "Airline Customer Service Commitment," whereby the ATA carriers committed themselves to offer the lowest fare available; to notify customers of known delays, cancellations, and diversions; to make every
reasonable effort to assure on-time baggage delivery; to petition the DOT to increase the
baggage liability limit from its current maximum liability of $1,250 per bag, in effect since
1984; to allow reservations to be held or canceled for twenty-four hours; to provide prompt
ticket refunds; to properly accommodate disabled and special needs passengers; to meet
customers' essential needs during long on-aircraft delays; to handle "bumped" passengers
with fairness and consistency; to disclose travel itinerary, cancellation policies, frequent flyer
rules, and aircraft configuration; to ensure good customer service from code-share partners;
and to be more responsive to customer complaints."i Each airline was to develop and implement a Customer Service Plan within six months. Congress and the Administration
promptly issued warnings that they would be closely monitoring the airlines' compliance
22
with this commitment.

17. See Randall Mikkelsen, White House Proposes New Air Traveler "Rights," available at <http://news.
lycos.com/stories/politics>.
18. Seeid.
19. See BTC UrgesAirlines to Choose Self-Reforms Over Government Intervention; Window of OpportunityClosing
Rapidly, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 12,1999, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus. BTC representatives who testified
at House Transportation Committee hearings held on March 10, cited lack of competition among major airlines
as the root cause of customer complaints. Passengers were not the only people complaining. Travel agents
complained about an earlier move by United, American, and Delta airlines that lowered the fee schedule that
the airlines pay travel agents for booking international flights. Under the new fee scale, a travel agent's commission is now capped at $100 or eight percent of the ticket cost, whichever is less. See also Amy Fletcher,
Airlines Take Piece of Agents' Profits/Local Travel Agent Accuse Airlines of Gouging Consumers with PricingMore,
CoLo. SPRINGS GAZETTE, Nov. 19, 1998, at BUS1.
20. See House's Passenger Bill of Rights May Not be Needed, Shushi Aide Says, AVIATION DAILY, May 27, 1999,
at 1.
21. See Air Transportation Association, Airline Customer Service Commitment, Press Release (June 1, 1999).
22. See ATA Customer Service Plan Draws Monitors from Congress, DOT, AvIATIoN DAILY, June 18, 1999,
at 1.
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International aviation was marked by significant differences between U.S. and European
transportation policies. In 1996, under pressure from U.S. carriers, Congress passed the
"Hatch Amendment," designed to provide a level playing field for U.S. carriers by requiring
non-U.S. flag airlines to implement the same security requirements as U.S. airlines on
flights to and from the United States.23 The provisions of the Act were designed to go into
effect when the FAA passed implementing legislation. At the end of 1998, the FAA issued
a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). "The proposed rule would condition the
Administrator's acceptance of a foreign air carrier's security program on a finding that the
security program requires adherence to the identical security measures that the Administrator requires U.S. air carriers serving the same airports to adhere to."24 The legislation and NPRM have provoked a storm of protest from the international aviation community. They argue the imposition of U.S. security requirements on flights from outside
the United States violates international norms, and specifically article 11 of the Chicago
Convention." Consequently, although the Hatch Amendment is law, it had not been implemented by early March 2000; rather, hearings on implementing regulations were still
being scheduled.26
In a remarkable parallel to the dispute over the Hatch Amendment, the European Parliament issued a regulation on the non-addition of hushkitted aircraft.27 The European
Union (EU) Commission had proposed,2" and the EU Council passed, a rule that effectively
bars the use of hushkitted aircraft in Europe.2 9 The United States claims that this rule is
clearly discriminatory against the United States, since the manufacture and installation of
hushkits is overwhelmingly an American industry?0 The Europeans explained that the high
level of environmental activism regarding noise surrounding European hub airports was
responsible for the public pressure behind this ban.3
Northwest Airlines filed a complaint with the DOT under the International Air Transportation Fair Competitive Practices Act of 1974,32 stating that the hushkitting prohibition
was in violation of international rules and asking for sanctions against carriers operating
from EU countries. 3 In a related retaliatory move, the House Transportation Committee
unanimously approved a bill prohibiting flights of the Anglo-French Concorde to the
United States if the European Union were to adopt the noise regulations regarding hushkitted aircraft.34 The European Union has remained committed to its regulation; nevertheless, in response to U.S. pressure, the European Union has delayed implementation of

23. 49 U.S.C. § 44906 (1996).
24. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Security Programs at Foreign Air Carriers, 63 Fed. Reg. 64,764 (1998).
25. See Comments of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) on the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking relating to Docket No. FAA-1998-4758.
26. See ATA Runs Ads, supra note 15, at 280.
27. See European Union Council of Ministoy, AvIArioN DAILY, Feb. 20, 1999, at 295.
28. Commission Proposal for a Council Common Position, No. 66/98, 1998 O.J. (C 4041).
29. Council Resolution 929/1999 (1999).
30. See EU Hushkit Rule Would Violate Bilaterals, Northwest Says, AVIATION DAILY, Jan. 20, 1999, at 102.
31. See Letter from Association of European Airlines, to the Department of Transportation (Feb. 3, 1999)
(on file with the DOT).
32. 49 U.S.C. § 41310 (1990).
33. See EU Huskit Rule, supra note 30.
34. See EU ProceedingWith Hushkit Ban Despite U.S. Appeal, AVIATION DAILY, Feb. 25, 1999, at 324.
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the rules.3 U.S. carriers, however, complained that the very existence of the proposal,
whether implemented or not, was adversely affecting the value of their equipment.3 6 There
were reports that EU negotiators were prepared to stay the regulations on condition that
the U.S. government commit to an accelerated development of Stage Four noise standards
within the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). U.S. negotiators refused to
negotiate Stage Four standards under the threat of the regulation. Conversely, the United
States was reportedly planning to bring an article 84 proceeding before ICAO. Article 84
is a rarely used provision to determine whether the proposed regulation complies with
international aviation standards. In turn, this has added another complication because the
Europeans are reluctant to negotiate under the U.S. threat of bringing an article 84
proceeding."
Although both the Hatch Amendment and the hushkit regulations are designed for immediate implementation, neither has gone into effect as a result of the lobbying efforts of
industry on both sides of the Atlantic with their respective regulatory authorities.
II. U.S.-U.K. Talks
Throughout 1999, the United States continued its bilateral open skies policy. Most of
the major U.S. aviation partners, with the exception of the United Kingdom, have already
concluded open skies or liberal bilateral agreements with the United States. Nevertheless,
the Bermuda H1agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom, concluded
in 1977, which allows only two U.S. carriers (United and American) to use Heathrow
Airport, remains in place.3"
The elusive prize of a U.S.-U.K. open skies agreement has remained tantalizingly out of
reach. At the end of 1998, after two years of talks, the United Kingdom broke off negotiations, reportedly at the behest of British Airways. British Airways had determined that it
would be too costly to surrender valuable Heathrow slots in exchange for approval of their
alliance.39 This failure left regulators on both sides of the Atlantic with a number of unresolved issues4 ° As a result, 1999 began on a note of low expectations. 41 Optimism in35. See Europe ConsidersDelaying Husbkit Ban, AVIATION DAILY, Oct. 7, 1999, at 1.
36. See U.S. Says EU "Cloud" Remains Over HushkittedAircraft, AVIATION DAILY, Oct. 20, 1999, at 2.
37. See Senate Wants ICAO To Rule On Validity of Europe'sHusbkit Ban, AVIATION DAILY, July 29, 1999.
38. See "Closed" Skies Over London Inflate Airline Ticket Prices, CoLo. SPRINGS GAZETTE, June 3, 1998, at
BUS1.
39. The failure to progress toward open skies repeated the results of the previous round of U.S.-U.K. talks
in February 1997, which had ended on a friendlier basis but with no significant progress. The United States
considers an open-skies agreement and wider access to London Heathrow Airport prerequisites to approval of
the British Airways-American alliance, while the United Kingdom believes approval of the alliance should
precede open skies. See U.S. Negotiators Walk Out of U.S.-U.K Talks, Cite Lack of Progress,AVIATION DAILY,
Oct. 8, 1998, at 47.
40. The president of British Airways, Robert Ayling, had
"pursued this deal with great determination, to the point of infuriating Europe's competition commissioner, Karel Van Miert. But [Ayling] has so far failed to persuade regulators on both sides of the
Atlantic, who are worried about the anti-competitive grip that BA/AA would have on transatlantic
traffic. When Mr. Van Miert asked BA to give up 267 slots at Heathrow in return for his approval,
Mr. Ayling backed off in favour of a looser, broader alliance, with AA, Canadian Airlines, Cathay
Pacific and Qantas."
Ayling's Failings,THE ECoNoMIsT, Jan. 16, 1999, at 60.
41. See Murphy, Citing "Hurdles," Casts Doubt on RestartingU.S.-U.K Talks, AVIATION DAILY, Jan. 21, 1999,
at 108.
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creased when British Midland (BM) announced plans to expand to the North Atlantic and
to seek an equity partner among the major alliances. This precipitated a year-long series of
States and United
on-again, off-again, formal and informal talks held between the United
4
Kingdom, with expectations rising and falling like a roller coaster. 1
By October 20, 1999, when BM announced its intention to join the Star Alliance, speculation increased that some form of U.S.-U.K. liberalization was at hand. The Star Alliance
would now control twenty-four percent of the Heathrow slots and nearly seventy percent
of the slots at Frankfurt, compared with British Airway's thirty-eight percent of Heathrow
4

slots. 1

The protracted nature of these negotiations had already strained U.S.-U.K. relationships
considerably. The commercial decision of British Airways to withdraw from its LondonPittsburgh route served to further exacerbate relationships between the United States and
the United Kingdom. This is because the highly restrictive U.S.-U.K. Bilateral Air Transportation Services Agreement does not permit U.S. Airways to take British Airways' place
on the abandoned route. As a result, Pittsburgh no longer has non-stop London service.
Representative Bud Shuster of Pennsylvania, the powerful Chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, has pressed for vigorous U.S. action against U.K.
aviation interests.- Needless to say, the British Airways-American Airlines One-World Alliance was compelled to continue to operate without code-sharing or any cooperation requiring regulatory approval. At the end ofJuly, the U.S. government terminated the request
of American Airlines and British Airways for antitrust immunity relative to their alliance
4
agreement. 1
III. Transadantic Common Aviation Area (TCAA)
Nineteen ninety-nine was the first full year of the new European Commission under the
presidency of Romano Prodi. Under the previous Commission, the director-general for

42. See British Midland Bids for U.S. Routes, AVIATION DAILY, Jan. 14, 1999, at 74; DOT Seeks Specifics on
American, United Chicago-LondonSummer Plans,AVIATION DAILY, Feb. 3, 1999, at 189; Slaterin Europe to Discuss
Hushkit Rule, Open Skies, AVIATION DAILY, Mar. 23, 1999, at 474; Prescott, Slater Will Meet April 20, AvIATION
DAILY, Apr. 12, 1999, at 62; American, Like U.S. Airways, Seeks Extra BilateralU.S.-U.K Rights, AVIATION DAILY,
Apr. 15, 1999, at 42; British Midland Chief OptimisticAbout U.S.-U.K. Bilateral,AVIATION DAILY, Apr. 23, 1999,
at 142; British Midland Seeks Special Exemption to Serve New York, AVIATION DAILY, May 12, 1999, at 243; U.K.
Presents Ideasfor Transition to Open Skies at London U.S.-U.K Talks, AVIATION DAILY, May 21, 1999, at 2; U.S.
Airways Presses DOT to Act on British Midland Request, AVIATION DAILY, May 25, 1999, at 6; Positive Comments
Following U.S.-U.K Talks May Be a Stage in Negotiations, AVIATION DAILY, June 1, 1999, at 1; British Cargo
Group Charges U.S. With "ProtectionistAgenda," AVIATION DAILY, July 6,1999, at 6; U.K. Delays BilateralTalks,
Plansfor Early July, AVIATION DAILY, June 8, 1999, at 1; British Midland Zeroes in on Choosing a U.S. Partner,
AVIATION DAILY, June 9, 1999, at 2; British Midland to PressureAuthorities on U.S.-U.K. Open Skies, AVIATION
DAILY, July 9, 1999, at 5; "U.K Wants Complete Open Skies," Transport Spokesman Says, AVIATION DAILY, Sept.
16, 1999, at 5; U.S.-U.K Schedules Talks on BilateralAviation Relationship, AVIATION DAILY, Sept. 20, 1999, at
3; U.K Delays BilateralTalks, Plansfor Early July, AVIATION DAILY, June 8, 1999, at 1; Congress Would Pressure
Brits, But Effect on U.S.-U.K Relations Unlikely, AVIATION DAILY, Oct. 26, 1999, at 2; Marshall Pushesfor New
lndo-U.K Bilateral,AVIATION DAILY, Nov. 29, 1999, at 5.
43. See British Midland Decides on StarAlliance, Begins Talks With Luftbansa, AVIATION DAILY, Oct. 20, 1999,
at 2; see also Lufthansa Acquires Stake in British Midland,AVIATIoN DAILY, Nov. 10, 1999, at 2.
44. See Shuster, Oberstar Threaten to Stop U.K Air Service to Chicago andNew York, AVIATION DAILY, Oct. 18,
1999, at 1.
45. Joint Application of American Airlines, Inc. and British Airways, Inc., U.S. Dep't of Transportation
Docket OST 97-2058 (July 30, 1999), available in 1999 WL 561619.
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competition had instituted an investigation into transatlantic alliances and indicated that
he was prepared to finalize a statement of objections with remedies.' 6 By the summer of
1997, the Commission had also instituted legal action against eight member states that had
entered into open skies agreements with the United States (Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), alleging violation of
the Treaty of Rome. The issue underlying the Commission's aggressive action against the
carriers and the member states was the protracted delay in the granting of a mandate giving
4
the Commission competence to negotiate external aviation agreements.
In an effort to get off on the right foot with the new Commission, the Association of
European Airlines (AEA) published a policy statement, "Towards a Transatlantic Common
Aviation Area. ' 4s The statement, endorsed unanimously by the twenty-eight members of
the AEA, declared:

46. In the summer of 1996, as a result of British Airways/American Airline's announcement that they would
seek antitrust immunity from the United States, the European Commission began an investigation into airline
alliances in general. On July 3, 1996, the Commission announced a procedure based on article 89 of the EU
Treaty, intended to enable the Commission to assess the compatibility of airline alliance agreements with EEC
rules on competition. See European Commission Mounts Competition Probe of Six Alliances, AvIATION DAILY, July
8, 1996, at 29; E.C. Advisers See 350 Fewer Slots, Service and Marketing Limits on AA-BA, AVIATmN DAILY, July
21, 1997, at 115. It soon became apparent that the Commission was prepared to make similar proposals with
respect to the other trans-Atlantic alliances. See As E. C. Waitsfor American/BA Response, American Says It Has
SettheBar Too High, AvIATIoN DAILY, Aug. 25, 1997, at 341. In January 1998, the European Commission
expanded its inquiry into Air France's alliance agreements with Delta and Continental. The Commission
indicated that this could lead to a statement of objections. See AVIATION DAILY, Jan. 8, 1998. On July 8, 1998,
the Commission proposed that certain alliances: (1) reduce frequencies on certain hub to hub routes;
(2) surrender slots at both U.S. and European airports under specified circumstances; (3) regulate alliance
corporate volume discounts and travel agent override commissions; and (4) restrict joint operation of frequent
flyer programs. See U.S. Dep't of Transportation Docket OST-98-4030, (July 8, 1998) at 7. To counter the
Commission's investigation, United Airlines filed a complaint with the DOT under the International AirTransportation Fair Competitive Practices Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. § 41310 (1999) (as amended), alleging that the
Commission's actions violate U.S. bilateral rights with specific member states and "reflect an indirect assault
on the fundamental, and successful, U.S. aviation policy of negotiating Open Skies agreements with individual
European countries." See DOT Docket OST 98-4030, supra, at 4.
47. On March 12, 1998, the Commission announced its intention to bring suit in the European Court of
Justice against the eight member states that have entered into liberal agreements with the United States because
the signing of bilateral aviation agreements with the United States violates EU law. EU Transport Commissioner Neil Kinnock stated "[bly unilaterally granting U.S. carriers traffic rights to, from and within the EU,
while ensuring exclusively for their own air carriers the right to fly from their territory to the United States,
these Member States create serious discrimination and distortions of competition, thereby rendering E.U. rules
ineffective." European Commission, Commission Takes Future Legal Action Against Member States' "Open Skies"
Agreement with the United States, Press Release IP/98/231 (Mar. 11, 1998), available at <http://europa.eu.int>.
"Article 169 of the Treaty provides a procedure to deal with all infringements of EU law. When a potential
case emerges, the Commission usually first uses informal meetings/letters to try and resolve the problem. If
informal talks fail, the Commission sends a letter of formal notice to the Member State concerned asking for
explanations. If these explanations are not fully satisfactory, the Commission delivers a reasoned opinion. The
reasoned opinion sets out the Commission's reasons of believing that the Member State concerned is breaking
the law. If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion, the Commission may bring the case to be
heard at the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg." Id.; see also EU:EU/Air Transport Commission Takes
Action Before the Court ofJusticeAgainst the Eight MemberStates That Have Concluded Open SkiesAgreements With
the United States, AGENCE EUROPE, Oct. 10, 1998.
48. Association of European Airlines, Towards a TransatlanticCommon Aviation Area, Sept. 1999 (visited Apr.
18, 2000) <http://www.aea.be/Publications/TCAA.htm>.
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If the airlines are to meet successfully the challenges of increasing globalization and large scale
competition, they must have the freedom to adapt their structure and operations to the pace
of change... . This requires broad regulatory reform... . The essential first step should be
Common Aviation Area, memberthe establishment by the EU and the US of a Transatlantic
49
ship of which should be open to other states as well.
The AEA policy would pave the way for the member states to grant the Commission the
competency to negotiate this comprehensive agreement with the United States. The main
elements of the AEAs statement contain what the AEA claims are detailed and realistic
proposals on how to bring about the necessary regulatory convergence in a TCAA: "matters
in respect of which harmonization is necessary; those in respect of which convergence could
take the form of mutual recognition; and those which could in principle be left at the
0
discretion of each party." According to the AEA, "[t]hese essential core features of the
agreement are: the freedom to provide services; airline ownership and the right of establishment; competition policy; leasing of aircraft."'"
"Constructing a Transatlantic Common Aviation Area is a dynamic, evolutionary pro2
cess." The policy statement argues that special institutional arrangements are required: in
particular, a body well equipped to ensure the proper day-to-day running of a system designed to promote and maintain regulatory convergence on an ongoing basis, in response
to changing requirements. Replacing the present regulatory regime with that of the TCAA
may, in certain cases, require temporary derogations from the agreed common rules, to
allow for a progressive removal of existing restrictions. Such transitional arrangements may
be justified where the new regime leads to substantial liberalization of market entry and
access, either in all markets or in specific countries where, so far, access restrictions apply.
The policy statement argues that EU member states requiring such arrangements should
essentially be free to negotiate the terms, without burdensome preconditions other than
some basic minimum requirements concerning the duration of the transitional period and
the need to ensure reciprocity and non-discrimination among EU member states and their
3
airlines during such a period.
On October 22, 1999, the chief executives of the AEA member carriers formally pre4
sented the Policy Statement on the TCAA to the European Commission. Loyola de Palacio del Valle Lersundi, the EU commissioner of transportation, has favorably referred to
the TCAA, and it appears that the TCAA may be the cornerstone of a European Com55
mission mandate.
On December 5-7, 1999, the DOT, led by Secretary Slater, sponsored a conference in
Chicago, attended by over 900 high-level aviation leaders from over sixty-two countries,
entitled "Aviation in the 21st Century-Beyond Opens Skies Ministerial." The meeting was
held in the same room where the original Chicago Convention was negotiated. The purpose
of the meeting was to create a forum for the world's aviation leaders to focus cooperatively

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. Seeid.
55. See Slater Holds "Informal Talks" Wit U.K Aviation Authoritiesat Summit in Chicago, AVIATION DAILY,
Dec. 8, 1999, at 1.
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on aviation issues in the twenty-first century. Included among the matters discussed were
the elimination of operating restrictions and barriers that restrict aviation and economic
growth, the encouragement of new approaches to aviation issues, including alliances, multior plurilateral arrangements, technology, and international cooperation. Other objectives
included the promotion of continuing expansion of aviation and, most of all,6 the creation
of a cooperative atmosphere of dialogue among the world's aviation leaders.1
The conference was declared a success by the DOT. Secretary Slater said the discussions
concluded that the "future evolution of a post-open skies aviation environment is likely to
advance on a broad front, in many directions, rather than down a single path" and that the
movement beyond open skies is likely to occur "in phases."5 He also stated that the conference produced "significant results ... and the identification of [many matters] of crucial
importance for the future of international aviation.""8
Buoyed by positive relations between the European carriers, particularly the TCAA initiative and Secretary Slater's Chicago Conference, the new millennium is beginning on a
positive note. With the elections promising a new administration in 2001, the coming year
could provide the time to develop major new directions in aviation.
V. Space Law Developments
A.

U.S. SPACE PROGRAM AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

During 1999, the U.S. National Air and Space Administration (NASA) found itself struggling to keep significant milestones from being overshadowed by the continued delays in
the progress of the international space station and the fiasco involving the Mars Climate
Orbiter. Months before it was due to rendezvous with Mars, the $124 million Orbiter was
rendered defunct as a result of the spacecraft team's failure to make a metric conversion.
One of NASA!s primary programs, the International Space Station (ISS), continued to
experience significant delays throughout the year. The close of 1999 found the Russian
Zvezda Service Module still on the ground, with no sign of the launch of this critical
component of the space station in sight.59 In addition, in NASNs effort to address management issues relating to the ISS, it requested the National Research Council (NCR) to
explore the viability of establishing a nongovernmental organization to oversee the management of research activities on and use of the ISS, including commercial activities.6 The
NRC issued this report in January 2000, strongly urging that NASA pursue this effort. 6'
Another program being pursued by NASA relating to reusable launchers, the $1.3 billion
X-33 program, experienced setbacks when an experimental liquid hydrogen fuel tank was
damaged in November while on the test stand. 2

56. See U.S. Dep't of Transportation, Aviation in the 21st Century-Beyond Open Skies MinisterialProgram,
Dec. 5-7, 1999 (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://www.dot.gov/affairs/1999/120599sp.htm>.
57. Chicago Aviation Summit ProducesIdeas for "Next Steps," AVIATION DAILY, Dec. 8, 1999, at 1.
58. Id.
59. See Frank Morring, Jr., Russia tells NASA Service Module Will Slip Into "April, May," AERosPAcE DAILY,
Dec. 16, 1999, at 419.
60. See Daniel S. Goldin, An Address to the Space Frontier Foundation Conference VIII, available at
<http://www.space-frontier.org/MEDIAROOM/OtherVoices/1999/9990924-goldin.html>.
DAILY, Jan. 12, 2000,
61. See NRC Panel Urges NASA to Move Quickly EstablisingStation NGO, AEROSPACE
at 57.
NEws, Nov. 15, 1999, at 1.
62. See Brian Berger, X-33 Could Face Lengthy Delays, SPACE
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Nevertheless, NASA was able to point to a number of successes, including significant
research gains by NASAs various orbiting observatories like the Hubble Space Telescope,
Galileo, and the Mars Global Surveyor. In addition, 1999 saw the successful deployment
of the Chandra X-Ray Observatory3 and launch of the space shuttle Columbia with the
first female flight commander, U.S. Air Force Col. Eileen Collins, at the controls.
B.

LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AND EVENTS

Developments in the legal arena saw trends in the U.S. regulatory regimes governing
various aspects of the aerospace and defense industries, including revisions and refinement
of export controls, licensing requirements, and activities subject to U.S. governmental approval. The industry proved to be a continually evolving and dynamic field, with various
mergers, acquisitions, and dissolutions of industry players and sectors (both within the
United States and internationally) occurring or verging on occurring throughout 1999.
C. U.S. EXPORT

CONTROLS

On March 15, 1999, the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal
Year 1999 was enacted, altering the scope of U.S. export controls and regulations.64 This
legislation transferred jurisdiction for a significant number of space-related items from the
U.S. Commerce Department to the U.S. Department of State. 65 Most significantly, commercial satellites and satellite-related hardware were expressly identified as "defense articles" and placed on the U.S. Munitions List (USML) of the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR).66 In addition, technology and technical services related to commercial
satellites were also specifically defined as "defense services," subject to the restrictions of
the ITAR. The transfer of jurisdiction thus placed commercial satellites and all related
technology (including related services) under the same strict regime of scrutiny, control,
and monitoring governing other munitions such as tanks, military aircraft, and artillery.
Failure to comply with the ITAR can result in both individual and organizational criminal
sanctions. 67 Thus, the practical result of the transfer was to make it more difficult for U.S.

63. See NASA's ChandraFindsAndromeda Black Hole, SPAcE NEws, Feb. 14, 2000, at 12.
64. Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-261, 112 Stat. 1920
(1999).
65. Id. The U.S. Department of State and Department of Commerce have shared responsibility for licensing
the export of commercial communications satellites since 1992. In 1996, the majority of the various aspects of
licensing responsibility shifted even more into the jurisdiction of the Commerce Department. Concerns over
the transfer of sensitive technology to the People's Republic of China, however, led to the passage of legislation
in 1998, returning control of all aspects of commercial communication satellites and related technology back
to the State Department.
66. See 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-30 (1999) (promulgated under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA)). The ITAR
controls the export of all items considered to be defense articles or services, and thus subject to the jurisdiction
of the Department of State, Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC).
67. The U.S. Munitions List (USML), contained in 22 C.F.R. § 121, sets forth specified articles that are
deemed to have substantial military application, or that are specifically designed or modified for military purposes. The USML also covers technical data (not limited to classified information) relating to defense articles,
as well as any information required for the design, development, production, manufacture, assembly, operation,
repair, testing, maintenance, or modification of defense articles. 22 C.F.R. § 120.10. If an item is placed on the
USML, the export of such items is regulated exclusively by the State Department, unless otherwise indicated
in the ITAR. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.5.
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companies in all spacecraft-related sectors to engage or to continue engaging in business
with non-U.S. firms or entities.
V. Commercial Launch Vehicles
In June 1999, the FAA Final Rule on Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Regulations (Final Rule) took effect.6s The Final Rule clarifies license application procedures
and requirements, including the requirements imposed upon use of federal launch ranges
relating to commercial space transportation that are governed by the Commercial Space
Launch Act of 1984 (the Act).69 The revisions put into effect through the Final Rule clarified
aspects regarding the scope of a launch license, the criteria for obtaining a license for
expendable launch vehicles, launching from federal launch ranges, and the underlying safety
rationale for the FAA's launch licensing regime. In addition, the Final Rule notes that the
FAA will now consider licensing the operation of a launch site or the launch of a launch
vehicle from a site that is not operated by a federal launch range on a case-by-case basis.
VI. Significant Events
Internationally, the U.N. Conference on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Unispace-3,
opened in Vienna, Austria during June 1999. Udipi Ramchandra Rao, a member of the
Indian Space Commission, was elected chairman of the conference.
In October 1999, the German and French governments announced a merger between
DaimlerChrysler Aerospace AG of Germany and Aerospatiale Matra and Marconi Electronic Systems of France. The fruition of the merger, anticipating approval by the European
Commission sometime in early 2000, is expected to create a subsidiary called Astrium,
which will eventually incorporate the space division of Italy's Alenia Aerospazio. With over
8,000 employees and annual revenues in excess of $2 billion, the trinational European
venture will be the largest space company in Europe.70
On the U.S. front, the U.S. House of Representatives passed legislation in November
1999 permitting Lockheed Martin Corp. to complete its planned acquisition of Comsat
Corporation, as the two companies had announced in September 1998.11 In September
1999, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) gave its blessing to Lockheed
Martin's plan to acquire forty-nine percent of Comsat Corporation. Lockheed Martin was
prohibited from purchasing any more Comsat shares, however, without legislation updating
the 1962 Communications Satellite Act, which limited the amount of ownership of the
U.S. government-created Comsat Corporation by any one shareholder. Efforts to reach
accord on any finalized legislation in 1999 were stymied by the inability of the House and
68. 14 C.F.R. §§ 401, 411, 413, 415, and 417 (1999).
69. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 70104-21 (1984). The Act authorizes the U.S. Secretary of Transportation to oversee,
license, and regulate commercial launch activities and the operation of launch sites that are carried out by U.S.
citizens or within the United States. The Act also directs the Secretary of Transportation to administer his
responsibilities pursuant to the Act in a manner consistent with ensuring public health and safety, the safety of
property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, and to encourage, facilitate,
and promote commercial space launches by the private sector. Id. at §§ 70103-05.
70. See Aerospatiale, DASA and Marconi Form Astrium, Oct. 18, 1999 (visited Apr. 18, 2000) <http://
www.spacelaw.com.au/main.htm>.
71. The U.S. Senate had passed its own version of legislation addressing the proposed merger earlier in
1999.
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the Senate to reach an agreement on provisions incorporated into the legislation that
were designed to force the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(INTELSAT) to privatize along the lines of the U.S. government's desires and demands.
The two primary international telecommunications organizations, the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) and INTELSAT, continued their efforts to privatize and become commercial entities. In April 1999, U.K.-based INMARSAT was the
first to privatize, bringing over three years of intergovernmental negotiations by its eightyfour member countries to closure."2 Meanwhile, INTELSAT, with its larger membership
of 143 countries (including the United States), continues in its laborious progress to evolve
into a private and commercial entity by its stated target date of April 1, 2001, despite having
to continually deal with pressure being exerted by the U.S. Congress to allow the U.S.
government to dictate the terms of the intergovernmental efforts towards privatization.73
The satellite operator industry as a whole also saw a spectacular rise and fall of numerous
ventures into the lower-earth and middle-earth orbits. The most widely publicized, Iridium,
was a $5 billion effort to launch a satellite constellation of sixty-six satellites in lower-earth
orbit to provide mobile voice and data services. After launching itself as a high-flying stock,
it quickly plummeted into Chapter 11 bankruptcy after it became clear that the product
was prohibitively expensive and considered unmanageable by the available market. Similarly, ICO's $3.5 billion business plan to operate a ten-satellite fleet in middle-earth orbit
was stymied by its inability to get a single satellite successfully launched.14 Perhaps the most
successful of the new ventures by comparison, Globalstar, a $4 billion venture with a
planned constellation of forty-eight satellites, nevertheless stepped into the unwelcome
limelight with a launch failure in 1999 that cost it twelve of its satellites in one blow.
The space industry as a whole met the challenges presented in 1999, but its performance
with regard to maintaining the ability to assess, implement, and bring to market technology
developments occurring at breakneck speed and to adequately address the constant divergence between regulatory and political concerns on both the domestic and international
levels was somewhat sub-standard. It is clear that the industry must seek to forge a stronger,
more cohesive relationship with the pertinent national agencies and achieve greater flexibility and innovation in meeting international market demands without sacrificing national
security and foreign policy concerns. Given the matrix of complex legal, regulatory, political, and policy-based issues that affect this business sector, the upcoming year promises to
bring significant challenges in reaching these objectives.

72. See generally Inmarsat (visited Apr. 18, 2000) <http://www.inmarsat.org>.
73. In March 2000, the controversial Open-Market Reorganization for the Betterment of International
Telecommunications Act (the ORBIT Act) passed both houses of Congress. S. 376,106th Cong. (1999). While
the ORBIT Act contained language assisting Lockheed Martin in its attempt to acquire Comsat Corporation,
it also contained provisions that imposed stringent and controversial mandates upon INTELSAT and its efforts
to negotiate intergovernmental agreements amongst all of its member countries with regard to INTELSAT's
privatization. Strong objections to the ORBIT Act were registered and presented to the U.S. Congress by
White House staff, the Departments of State and Commerce, and the FCC. Nevertheless, U.S. domestic
interests (in particular, those of Lockheed Martin which required legislative authorization for its merger with
Comsat) continued the forward momentum of the ORBIT Act to its passage.
74. Woeful news continued to follow ICO into the year 2000. On March 12, 2000, the attempt to finally
launch the first ICO satellite (built by Hughes) turned out to be unsuccessful when Sea Launch's Zenit 3SL
launch vehicle upon which the spacecraft rode malfunctioned, causing it and its payload to plunge into the
Pacific Ocean. See Justin Ray, DisasterStrikes Sea Launch Carrying First ICO Satellite, SPACEFLIGHT, Mar. 13,
2000, available at <http://www.spaceflightnow.com/sealaunch/icol/index.html>.
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